The profitability of workers' compensation insurance has improved dramatically over the past few years. At the same time the use of large insurance deductibles has been on the rise across the country. This is one of the first studies to empirically test whether deductibles are associated with changes in employer workers' compensation costs, and hence, may be responsible for at least some of the improvement seen in the area of workers' compensation. The authors' findings strongly suggest that the selection of a workers' compensation insurance policy with a large deductible had an immediate impact on reducing the cost of high-dollar indemnity claims and a delayed effect on reducing workers' compensation claim rates.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, profitability has returned to the workers' compensation insurance market. Insurers have experienced a dramatic improvement in their combined loss ratios and the frequency of workers' compensation indemnity claims has been on the decline.
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workers' compensation insurance has more than doubled since 1992, accounting for approximately $8 billion in premium credits in 1994.
2 Though state workers' compensation reforms are often cited as the major reason for the improved underwriting results, this article explores the possibility that deductibles, through the creation of incentives for employers to prevent injuries and control the cost of claims, also have contributed to the downward turn in loss ratios.
A number of safety and loss control incentives are inherent in the state workers' compensation systems. These incentives include statutory waiting periods for income benefits, income replacement rates, the workers' compensation experience rating system, self-insurance, retrospective rating, 3 the deregulation of insurance rates, and insurance deductible options, and they can potentially impact the behavior of both employees and employers. For instance, an increase in the real income replacement rate creates an incentive for employees to stay off work longer and it also creates an incentive for the employer to invest more resources in safety to avoid these higher benefit payments. To date, few empirical studies have involved risk-sharing insurance arrangements and their impact on employer costs. Although some studies found no evidence that experience rating workers' compensation premiums reduces injury rates (Chelius and Smith 1983 and 1993) or the duration of lost time from workplace injuries (Krueger 1990 , Kralj 1995 , most studies support the notion that loss control incentives reduce employer costs. Ruser (1985 and 1991) and Worrall and Butler (1988) found that the closer firms came to being fully experience rated 4 (i.e., their premiums are based solely on their own experience as opposed to their class experience), the lower their workers' compensation claim rates. Thomason (1993) found the probability of permanent partial disability to be lower for experience-rated employers obtaining insurance through private-sector insurance carriers. A study that tested the effects on fatality rates in Canada of a transition from a flat or manual premium rating system to an experience rating system provides strong evidence to support the hypothesis that experience rating improves workplace safety (Bruce and Atkins 1993) . Moore and Viscusi (1990) found that as benefit levels increased, the risk of work-related deaths decreased. They concluded that the use of death rates, as opposed to injury rates, eliminates moral hazard problems from the analysis, and the findings of their study provide strong evidence that employers do invest in safety when faced with the risk of higher costs. Victor (1985) , utilizing a simulation model to measure the injury prevention and loss control incentives associated with the experience-rating system, provides compelling arguments that experience rating may provide greater incentives than self insurance, which is not subject to experience rating.
Among the loss-control incentives cited, loss-sensitive insurance arrangements such as insurance deductibles seem to offer employers the greatest direct benefit from investing in injury prevention programs and improved claims management strategies. Large deductible policies, which incorporate elements of self insurance and experience rating, may prove to have the most powerful safety/loss control incentives yet. In theory, a firm which selects a large deductible policy (typically ranging from $100,000 to $5 million per accident) 5 takes on the majority of the policy risk and should have a strong incentive both to prevent injuries from occurring and to manage claims in a cost-effective manner.
Despite the straightforward theoretical implication of the impact deductible policies can have on reducing claim costs, combining deductible options with workers' compensation insurance is a relatively new concept. The first deductible programs began in the early 1980s with limited deductible options for medical and death benefits. Since then, the national availability of workers' compensation insurance with deductible options has grown rapidly. In the early 1990s, most U.S. jurisdictions passed legislation and/or insurance department rules that permitted the use of workers' compensation insurance deductibles. By July 1993, 43 jurisdictions had instituted deductible programs: 35 permitted or mandated both small and large deductibles, 4 permitted or mandated only large deductibles, and 4 permitted or mandated only small deductibles (Gula and Shields 1993) . Interestingly, such a growth in popularity of deductible options in workers' compensation insurance was observed to be accompanied by a dramatic decrease in claim costs. Since many other workers' compensation reforms were also adopted during this period, questions such as "Have deductible policies contributed to the reduction in workers' compensation costs?" and "How much of the reduction in costs can be attributed to deductible policies?" are naturally raised. This article intends to answer these questions using data from the state of Texas.
6
Texas serves as an excellent state in which to test the incentive effects associated with large deductible policies because Texas employers gained access to insurance deductibles on January 1, 1992, and self-insurance did not become an option for private sector employers until January 1, 1993. This unusual timing of deductible access preceding self-insurance access created a thriving market for large deductibles in Texas, allowing for a sufficient number of employers to statistically test the injury prevention and loss control effects of these risk-sharing arrangements.
7
This study directly tests the statistical relationship between large insurance deductibles and employer costs. Employer costs are measured by the frequency of workers' compensation claims (total and indemnity claim rates) and the per-claim costs for highdollar (incurred losses of $5,000 or more) indemnity claims.
With the elimination of sample selection bias and temporal trends, the authors find that the selection of a workers' compensation insurance policy with a large deductible did not have an immediate impact on claim rates. However, by the third year of the deductible policy, these loss-sensitive insurance arrangements were found to be associated with a 39.8 percent decline in indemnity claim rates when compared to the pre-effect year. The deductible policy did, however, have an immediate impact on the cost of high-dollar claims. The presence of a deductible policy was associated with a 12 percent decline in per-claim incurred losses on high-dollar indemnity claims in the first year of the deductible policy. These findings support the notion that insurance deductibles, through built-in incentives for employers to control costs, may have helped to contribute to the revitalization of the workers' compensation insurance market.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, the data and statistical models used to test the impact of deductible policies on workers' compensation claim rates and costs are explained. The results from the estimation are listed and explained in the section titled "Empirical Results." The final section of the article contains the authors' concluding observations.
DATA AND STATISTICAL MODELS
Two separate analyses were conducted. The first tests the relationship between large deductible policies and workers' compensation claim rates. The second analysis explores the relationship between deductibles and the cost of high-dollar workers' compensation indemnity claims. Details about the data and statistical models are provided below.
Claim Rate Analysis
Included in the claim rate analysis were 4,394 Texas firms with 50 or more employees. Of these firms, 220 purchased workers' compensation insurance with large deductibles in 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the "deductible group"), the first year these loss-sensitive policies became available in Texas, and continued their deductible policy through 1994. 8 The rest of the firms in the sample purchased a full-cover-7 It should be noted that employers were able to choose retrospectively rated policies prior to the 1992 deductible law going into effect and it is reasonable to assume that most of the firms included in this study (with an average employment size of approximately 900 workers) had retrospectively rated policies prior to selecting their deductible policy in 1992. This probably results in an underestimate of what the effect of deductibles would be on a strictly manually rated policy (which is also subject to experience rating). 8 If a firm had a full-coverage policy in 1992 but either moved into self insurance (which became an option in 1993) some time in or after 1993, it was removed from the analysis.
age workers' compensation insurance policy in 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the "full-coverage group").
9
The firms included in this study represent the universe of Texas employers which met the employment size criteria, and could readily be matched to the workers' compensation claims database. 10 Based on dates of injury, workers' compensation employer claim rates for four distinct periods were analyzed: a pre-effect period before employers could purchase deductible policies (1991); an immediate-effect period that included the first policy year (1992) deductible policies were available; a delayedeffect period that included the second policy year (1993) deductible policies were available; and an even further delayed-effect period that included the third policy year (1994) deductible policies were available.
11 Since 4,394 firms were followed for four years, in total the authors have 17,576 observations included in the analysis.
Two analyses were conducted for claim rates using simple linear regression models: one for the total claim rate (i.e., the number of total claims per 100 employees), 12 and one for indemnity claim rate (i.e., the number of indemnity claims per 100 employees).
13 Simple descriptive statistics on the claim rates for the deductible group and full-coverage groups reveal that firms with higher claim rates tended to purchase workers' compensation insurance with deductibles more readily when such insurance became available. For example, the average total claim rate for the full-coverage group in 1991 was 3 percent while the same rate for the deductible group was as high as 4.66 percent. The sharp discrepancy in claim rates between these two groups is apparently the result of mutual selections by the involving firms and the insurance companies. In order to control for the selection bias, a dummy variable DEDUCT was defined for the firms in the deductible group and was included in the model as an explanatory variable.
The accumulated effects of insurance deductibles on claim rates in the first (1992), second (1993) , and third (1994) post-deductible policy years using the pre-effect year (1991) as a benchmark are intended to be tested. Temporal trends in claim rates may exist. For instance, claim rates in general could be lower in 1994 than in 1991 because of a variety of different reasons, including legislative reforms and an increased em- 9 If there was an indication that a firm had a full-coverage policy in 1992 but either moved into self insurance or deductible insurance sometime in or after 1993, it was removed from the analysis. However, because of the limitation of the information available, it is possible that a small percentage of firms switched from a full-coverage policy to a deductible policy in 1993 or 1994 were undetected so that they were included in the sample as full-coverage firms. The possible existence of a small percentage of such firms in the full-coverage group does not undermine this study's findings, although it may result in a slight underestimation of the effects of deductibles on employers' costs. 10 Firms for which reliable employment size or claim information could not be obtained were dropped from the analysis. In addition, firms that did not have continuous workers' compensation coverage over the 1991 to 1994 period were not included in the analysis. 11 In order to equate time periods and groups, a restriction on the length of the interval between the date of injury and the date the claim was "established" (effectively filed) was imposed. That is, a claim had to be established within 85 days of the injury date in order to be included in the analysis. 12 The total claim rate includes both indemnity and medical-only claims that resulted in more than one day of lost time. 13 The indemnity claim rate includes all claims that resulted in an income benefit payment. phasis on disability management and workplace safety by employers. Year dummies (DUM92, DUM93, and DUM94) were introduced into the model to control for the trends in claim rates. Other variables available that might explain deviations in the claim rates are also included in the model. These variables are average number of workers per firm (FIRM_SIZE); industry dummy variables for each major industry (MINING, CONSTRUCTION & AGRICULTURE, MANUFACTURING, TRANSPOR-TATION, RETAIL, FINANCE, and SERVICE) with wholesale trade excluded from the model and serving as the reference industry; and the interaction terms of DE-DUCT and dummy variables DUM92, DUM93, and DUM94 (D_EFFECT92, D_EFFECT93, and D_EFFECT94). The hypothesis of most interest, that the selection of a deductible policy produces subsequent changes in claim rates in first, second, and third policy years, was tested by the coefficients of the variables D_EFFECT92, D_EFFECT93, and D_EFFECT94, respectively. Table 1 exhibits the intercept of the model for deductible group and full-coverage group in the pre-effect year (1991), first policy year (1992), second policy year (1993) , and third policy year (1994) , where d is the coefficient of the dummy variable DE-DUCT, d92 is the coefficient of DUM92, d93 is the coefficient of DUM93, d94 is the coefficient of DUM94, deff92 is the coefficient of D_EFFECT92, deff93 is the coefficient of D_EFFECT93, and deff94 is the coefficient of D_EFFECT94. The accumulated effects of the deductible policy in the first, second, and third policy years were tested by the significance of deff92, deff93, and deff94, respectively. 
Claim Cost Analysis
In the claim cost analysis, only the first-year effect of insurance deductibles on claim costs are tested because of the limitation of the data sets available. Although it would have been beneficial to conduct the claim cost analysis using the firm-level data similar to the claim rate analysis, the only reliable and accessible claim cost data are the Detailed Claim Information (DCI) database, an indemnity database that contains private insurance claims with incurred losses of $5,000 or more. 14 A significant number of the firms included in the claim rate analysis could not be matched to the DCI data in both the pre-effect and first policy years. Thus, the number of firms in the deductible group would be too small to generate reliable results if we imposed a condition that required firms to have at least one claim match in both the pre-effect year (1991) and first policy year (1992) . 15 On the other hand, claim costs are more injury specific than claim rates. A cost analysis at individual-claim level allows us to better explain the deviation in claim costs using individual-level claim injury information. Consequently, a cost analysis at claim level is conducted, as opposed to the firm level used in the claim rate analysis.
Federal Employer Identification Numbers (FEINs) from the 4,394 employers identified in the claim rate analysis described above were matched to the DCI claims that were injured in either pre-effect year (1991) or first policy year (1992), resulting in a total of 14,327 successful matches. Of these, 4,838 claims were pre-effect year (1991) claims from the full-coverage group, 2,895 were pre-effect year claims from the deductible group, 4,170 were first policy year (1992) claims from the full-coverage group, and 2,424 were first policy year claims from the deductible group. These 14,327 claims make up the data set for the claim cost analysis.
The claim cost regression model used incurred per-claim losses 16 as the dependent variable and 13 independent variables to explain the variation in claim costs. Similar to the claim rate analysis, the dummy variable DEDUCT for the firms in the deductible group was included in the model to control the sample selection bias. DUM92, a dummy variable for the first policy year, was included in the model to control the trend in claim cost. The impact of insurance policies with large deductibles on perclaim incurred losses in the first policy year was tested by the coefficient of D_EFFECT, the interaction term of DEDUCT and DUM92. Other variables included in the model are as follows: FIRM_SIZE, SPRAIN, LOWBACK, SURGERY, IMPAIR, PREWAGE, AGE, ATTORNEY, MALE, and TENURE, where FIRM_SIZE is the number of workers employed by the firm; SPRAIN is a dummy variable for sprains and strains; LOWBACK is a dummy variable for lower back injuries; SURGERY indicates whether the injured worker had surgery as a result of the injury; IMPAIR is the permanent impairment rating assigned to the injured worker; PREWAGE is the injured worker's weekly wage before injury, AGE is the injured worker's age at the time of the injury, ATTORNEY is a flag indicating whether the injured worker had an attorney, MALE is a dummy variable for male injured workers, and TENURE is a measure of employment tenure of the injured worker as defined as the difference between injury date and hire date. Again, D_EFFECT is the variable of interest, and the rest of the independent variables are used to control for differences specific to each claim (e.g., claimant's age, claim severity, injury type, claim dispute), which might explain some of the variation in claim costs.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Because the data used in the analysis comprise time-series and cross-section data, heteroscedasticity may exist. In fact, the existence of heteroscedasticity was tested and significant heteroscedasticity was found in each estimation (White, 1980) . In order to obtain valid inferences and more efficient parameter estimates, a feasible GLS estimation procedure was employed. The results are presented below.
Claim Rates
A negative statistically significant relationship was found between large deductibles and the frequency of both total workers' compensation claims and indemnity claims. However, the relationship did not emerge until the third policy year (1994) that the deductible was in place indicating a delayed effect (see Table 2 ). Notes: N = 17,576. * indicates statistical significance at the .10 level, ** indicates statistical significance at the .05 level and *** indicates statistical significance at the .01 level (two-tailed test). Wholesale trade served as the reference categories for industry dummy variables. The agriculture category was combined with construction due to small number of agriculture firms in the sample, and the similarity in BLS incidence rates for the construction and agriculture firms. Only claims established within 85 days from the injury date are included in the rates.
The momotonic increasing pattern of the coefficients of the variables D_EFFECT92, D_EFFECT93, and D_EFFECT94, both in size and the level of significance, strongly suggests that the delay is likely the result of a learning curve on the part of employers. Firms that selected a deductible policy in 1992 required a couple of years to develop and implement an effective program for reducing on-the-job injuries. The corresponding statistical significance was stronger for indemnity claim rates than for total claim rates. The calculated percent of decrease in claim rates resulting from the deductible policy also reflects the relative strength of the relationship. The presence of a deductible policy resulted in a 16.4 percent decrease in total claims and 39.8 percent decrease in indemnity claims when the third year of the deductible policy is compared to the pre-deductible period.
17
The dummy variable, DEDUCT, which indicated whether the firm belonged to the deductible group, was positive and significant for both the total claim rate and indemnity claim rate models. That is, firms with deductibles had higher total and indemnity claim rates than firms that did not opt for deductibles. The increased propensity of firms with high claim rates and high per-claim costs to successfully purchase large deductibles as part of their workers' compensation insurance policy may be related to a number of different factors such as larger perceived savings by riskier firms 18 and more intensive marketing of these policies to the riskier firms by insurance companies.
The policy year dummy variables reflect considerable variation in total and indemnity claim rates. When compared to the pre-deductible time period (1991), total claim rates rose in policy years 1992 and 1993 before dropping in 1994. When compared to the pre-deductible time period, indemnity claim rates were significantly lower in 1992, 1993, and 1994. For the industry dummies, the signs of the coefficients were as expected. The coefficients for some of the riskier industries (construction/agriculture) had positive signs and were significant, indicating that they are associated with higher claim rates than the reference category (wholesale trade). Predictably, less risky industries (finance, service, retail trade, among others) consistently were significant with negative signs, indicating they are associated with lower claim rates. The coefficient of FIRM_SIZE in the total claim rate model is significantly negative indicating that bigger firms tend to have lower total claim rates.
Claim Costs
In the first year of their deductible policies, a significant negative relationship developed between whether a firm chose a large deductible policy and the average cost of high-dollar claims (with incurred losses of $5,000 or more), which is indicated by the highly significant (p < .01) coefficient of the interaction term in the model (D_EFFECT92) as shown in Table 3 . In the first year of its deductible policy, the incentive effects of that risk-sharing relationship resulted in a 12 percent reduction in the cost of high-dollar claims.
19
17 The percentage change in claim rates is calculated with the following formula: % Change in claim rate = deff94/(|deff94|+MRATE), where deff94 is the coefficient of the deductible effect variable for the year of interest (policy year 1994) and MRATE is the average claim rate for the deductible group in the year of interest. 18 It may be the case that firms with high claim costs have a greater incentive to economize on cash flow. They may be more willing to take the deductible credit and invest the float in financial placements. This is especially true when returns in the financial markets are lucrative. 19 Here, % Change in high-dollar claim cost = deff92/(|deff92|+ MCOST), where deff92 is the coefficient of the deductible effect variable in 1992, and MCOST is the mean cost of highdollar claims for the deductible group.
The results indicate that firms were much more capable of immediately reducing the cost of high-dollar claims than they were in preventing them. It is reasonable to assume that comprehensive accident prevention programs might take longer to develop than claims management programs. Hence, in a shorter time frame, firms with deductibles were able to better their claims management approach by doing such things as improving communications with injured workers and health-care providers and implementing early return-to-work programs, which can result in immediate cost savings. It is also possible that a new type of moral hazard on the part of the employer resulted in some of the cost reductions observed here. That is, employers may have controverted legitimate workers' compensation claims in an effort to contain costs.
The dummy variable for whether the claimant worked for an employer with a deductible policy yielded a significant positive coefficient, indicating that, holding all else constant, these "deductible claims" were more costly than "non-deductible claims." The negative sign of the coefficient of DUM92 indicated that the high-dollar claim costs in general were going down between 1991 and 1992, the first year of deductibles.
Other variables used in the claim cost model behaved as predicted. Coefficients for surgery, attorney involvement, permanent impairment rating, lower back injuries, and the worker's age and weekly wage prior to injury were positive and significant, indicating they are associated with higher costs. The coefficients for firm size, em- ployment tenure, and sprains were negative and significant, indicating they are associated with lower costs.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The findings in this article suggest that the increased use of deductibles is responsible for at least some of the improvement in the loss ratios experienced in the workers' compensation insurance market in recent years. The correlation between dropping loss ratios and the increased use of large deductibles across the nation may be explained by these empirical results, which show a strong relationship between deductibles and reduced employer costs. This study clearly illustrates that the presence of a deductible policy is significantly associated with decreasing employer workers' compensation costs. Furthermore, the empirical evidence provided in this article indicates that these costs have been reduced in two ways: (1) by reducing the cost of individual high-dollar claims, and (2) by reducing the frequency of claims.
The significant drop in claim rates and costs under deductible policies revealed in this study could be coming from three somewhat interrelated sources: (1) the moral hazard under full-coverage insurance, which may induce employers not to put maximum effort into cost containment because the risk is being borne by the insurance carrier; (2) the additional effort of employers with deductible policies to reduce the frequency and severity of workplace injury claims; and (3) the moral hazard under deductible policies that provides an incentive for employers to controvert legitimate workers' compensation claims in an effort to contain costs. The degree to which each of these factors impacts claim rates and costs is unknown. Additional research is needed for a full assessment of the effect of deductible insurance policies since the reduction in workers' compensation costs from the various incentives created by workers' compensation insurance arrangements have different implications for social welfare.
